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in Uplink Multiuser Systems
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Abstract—This letter proposes a novel dual user selection
scheme for uplink transmission with multiple users, where a
jamming user and a served user are jointly selected to improve
the secrecy performance. Specifically, the jamming user transmits
jamming signal with a certain rate, so that the base station
(BS) can decode the jamming signal before detecting the secret
information signal. By carefully selecting the jamming user and
the served user, it makes the eavesdropper decode the jamming
signal with a low probability meanwhile the BS can achieve a
high receive signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Therefore, the uplink
transmission achieves the dual secrecy improvement by jamming
and scheduling. It is shown that the proposed scheme can
significantly improve the security of the uplink transmission.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, ergodic secrecy rate,
dual user selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security has emerged as a promising tech-
nique to improve the security of wireless communications [1].
Roughly speaking, a positive secrecy rate is achieved only if
the main channel is better than the wiretap channel. However,
it can not be always guaranteed due to channel fading. In
order to make the wiretap channel “worse” than the main
channel, the use of friendly jamming to selectively degrade the
eavesdropper’s channel has been considered in [2]-[4]. When
there are multiple users in the systems, user selection can make
the BS-user pair facilitate a good channel conditions [5]-[6]. It
has been shown that the security can be significantly enhanced
by friendly jamming or user selection.
In order to achieve both the benefit of friendly jamming and
user selection, we propose a novel dual user selection scheme
for uplink transmission without jamming signal coordination.
Specifically, the user with the best channel condition to the
BS will send jamming signals to create interference at the
eavesdropper, while a selected served user will simultaneously
Manuscript received April 22, 2016; revised June 6, 2016; accepted June 17,
2016. Date of publication XXXXX, 2016; date of current version XXXXX,
2016. The work of H. Deng, H.-M. Wang and W. Wang was supported in part
by the Foundation for the Author of National Excellent Doctoral Dissertation
of China under Grant 201340, the National High-Tech Research and De-
velopment Program of China under Grant No.2015AA01A708, and the New
Century Excellent Talents Support Fund of China under Grant NCET-13-0458.
The work of M. H. Lee was supported by MEST 2015 R1A2A1A05000977,
NRF, Korea. The associate editor coordinating the review of this paper and
approving it for publication was T. Q. Duong. (Corresponding author: Hui-
Ming Wang.)
H. Deng, H.-M. Wang and W. Wang are with the School of Electronic
and Information Engineering, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, P.
R. China, and H. Deng is also with the School of Physics and Electronics,
Henan University, Kaifeng 475001, P. R. China. (e-mail: gavind@163.com;
xjbswhm@gmail.com; wjwang@xjtu.edu.cn).
M. H. Lee is with the Division of Electronics Engineering, Chonbuk Na-
tional University, Jeonju 561-756, South Korea (e-mail: moonho@jbnu.ac.kr).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/LCOMM.2016.XXXXX
transmit secret information signals to the BS. In the following,
we call them jamming user and served user, respectively. By
exploiting prior channel state information (CSI) of the main
channels, the jamming user will transmit the jamming signal
with a certain rate so that the BS can cancel out it by applying
successive interference cancellation (SIC) [7]. In contrast, the
eavesdropper would decode the jamming signal successfully
with a low probability. Even when the eavesdropper decodes
the jamming signal before detecting the information signal,
the BS would achieve an higher average receive SNR than the
eavesdropper by carefully selecting the served user. Therefore,
secure communications can be definitely guaranteed.
Notations: Cnm denotes the combinatorial number m over
n, log(.) denotes base-e logarithm, E1 (x) =
∫∞
x
e−t
t
dt
is the zero-th incomplete gamma function, Li2 (x) =
−
∫ x
0
log(1−t)
t
dt is the Euler dilogarithm function, and γ =
0.57721566 · · · is the Euler constant.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an multiuser uplink transmission consisting of
a base station (BS), K users, and an eavesdropper. Each node
is equipped with a single antenna. The quasi-stationary flat-
fading channel coefficients from the i-th user to the BS and the
eavesdropper, hi and gi, are independent identically distributed
(i.i.d.) complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and
unit variance, for i = 1, · · · ,K . Without loss of generality,
we consider that the users are ordered based on their channel
quality, i.e., it holds |h1|2 ≤ · · · ≤ |hK |2. The noises at the
BS and the eavesdropper are assumed to be complex additive
white Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance δ2n.
In each time slot, two users are selected from the K
users, one jamming user and one served user. During the
transmission, the jamming user sends jamming signals z and
the served user simultaneously transmits secret information
signal s with the same power P/2, where both s and z follow
with CN (0, 1). Suppose that the m-th user and the n-th user
has been selected as the jamming user and the served user,
respectively. Then the received signals at the BS and the
eavesdropper can be expressed as
yb =
√
P/2hmz +
√
P/2hns+ nb, (1)
ye =
√
P/2gmz +
√
P/2gns+ ne, (2)
The receive SNR for the BS to detect the jamming signal
is given by
Γm,nb,z =
|hm|
2
|hn|2 +
2
ρ
, (3)
where ρ = P
δ2n
is the transmit SNR. The jamming user would
send jamming signal with a rate RJ satisfying RJ ≤ log(1 +
2Γm,nb,z ), so that the BS can cancel out the jamming signal before
detecting the secure information signal. Hence, the achievable
rate of the information signal at the BS is
Cb,s = log
(
1 +
ρ
2
|hn|
2
)
. (4)
The receive SNR for the eavesdropper to detect the jamming
signal is given by
Γm,ne,z =
|gm|2
|gn|2 +
2
ρ
. (5)
Similarly, we assume that SIC will be carried out at the
eavesdropper. It will detect the jamming signal before decod-
ing the secrecy information signal. If the rate of the jamming
signal exceeds the capacity, i.e., RJ > log(1 + Γm,ne,z ), the
eavesdropper can not decode the jamming signal successfully,
and thus it treats the jamming signal as noise [7]. In contrast,
if RJ ≤ log(1 + Γm,ne,z ), the jamming signal can be decoded
successfully and thus cancelled out at the eavesdropper. Hence,
the achievable rate at the eavesdropper is
Ce,s =
{
log
(
1 + ρ2 |gn|
2
)
, RJ ≤ log(1 + Γm,ne,z ),
log
(
1 + |gn|
2
|gm|2+
2
ρ
)
, RJ > log(1 + Γ
m,n
e,z ).
(6)
Typically, for a passive eavesdropper, its CSI can not be
available at the BS. Therefore, we use ergodic secrecy rate
(ESR) as the performance metric, which is defined as [8]
Rs =
{
E [Cb,s]− E [Ce,s]
}+
, (7)
where {x}+ = max(0, x).
Obviously, the selections of jamming user and served user
would impact greatly on the secrecy performance of the
proposed scheme. In the following, we will give the details
about how to select the jamming user and the served user.
III. JAMMING USER AND SERVED USER SELECTION
A. Jamming User Selection
We first focus on the selection of jamming user. Since
when RJ ≤ log(1 + Γm,ne,z ), the eavesdropper can decode
the jamming signal before detecting the secret information
signal. This implies that the jamming user should transmit the
jamming signal with a rate as high as possible to defeat the
potential eavesdropping. Therefore, the jamming user should
transmit the jamming signal with a rate up to the capacity
log(1 + Γm,nb,z ). Observing Eqn. (3), we can know that when
the jamming user and the served users are the pair who
satisfies that |h|2m is much larger than |h|2n, it would achieves
a large value of Γm,nb,z . This makes the eavesdropper achieve
a low probability to decode the jamming signal successfully.
Hence, it is reasonable to select the user with the best channel
condition as the jamming user. That is, the K-th user operates
as a jamming user and will transmit the jamming signal with
a rate log(1+ΓK,nb,z ). Now we focus on the selection of served
user. Since the secrecy rate is the difference between the rates
achieved at the BS and the eavesdropper, it requires that the
served user should have a good channel condition. However,
selecting a user with good channel channel condition as the
served user would reduce the jamming rate. Therefore, there is
a tradeoff between the jamming rate and the achievable rate at
the BS. In the following, we will determinate the served user
by finding the n-th user who achieves the maximum ESR.
B. Auxiliary Results
In this subsection, we provide the following lemma that will
be used in the ESR analysis.
Lemma 1: Define T = |hK |
2
|hn|2+
2
ρ
, its cumulative distribution
function (CDF) is
FT (t) =


∑K−n
i=0
∑n−1
j=0
Ξije
−
2ti
ρ
i(t−1)+K−n+1+j , t ≥ 1,∑K−n
i=0
∑n−1
j=0 Ξij
e
−
2ti
ρ −e
−
2t(K−n+1+j)
ρ(1−t)
i(t−1)+K−n+1+j , 0 ≤ t < 1,
where
Ξij ,
{
(−1)inCnK C
i
K−n, j = 0,
(−1)i+jnCnK C
i
K−n
(n−1)···(n−j)
j! , j ≥ 1.
(8)
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
C. ESR and Served User Selection
In this section, we give the served user selection scheme
to achieve the maximal ESR. The exact ESR of the proposed
scheme is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1: When the n-th user is selected as the served
user and the K-th user operates as a jamming user, the
achievable ESR can be expressed as
Rs =
{
K∑
i=1
(−1)i+1CiK e
2i
ρ E1
(
2i
ρ
)
−
K−1∑
i=n
i∑
j=0
(−1)j CiK C
j
i
e
2(K+j−i)
ρ E1
(
2(K + j − i)
ρ
)
− 1 +
2
ρ
e
2
ρ E1
(
2
ρ
)
− e
2
ρΨ
}+
,
where Θ(u) , e
2η
ρ E1
(
2η
ρ
)
+1−log(u+1)
(u+1)2 −
2
ρ
e
2η
ρ E1
(
2η
ρ
)
u(u+1) , η =
u+1
u
, and Ψ =
∫∞
0 Θ(u)FT (u)du.
Proof: Please see Appendix B.
Although Theorem 1 does not provide a closed form
expression for Rs, it can be easily obtained by numerical
computation. Using Theorem 1, the index of the served user
can be determined by one dimension search.
Next, we investigate the asymptotic behavior of the ESR
in the high SNR regime. An approximation of the result in
Theorem 1 is given in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1: In the high SNR regime (ρ → ∞), a closed-
form expression of the ESR is given as
RHis ≈
{ log ρ2 − 1− γ
2
+̟ −
K−n∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=0
Ξij
i
Υij
}+
, (9)
where
Υij =


log ρ2+1−γ
8 +
log 2
4 −
3
8 , ξij = 1,
νij +
2
(
Li2(
ξij−1
ξij
)−Li2(
ξij−1
2ξij
)
)
−Li2(−ξij)+ζ1
(1−ξij)2
, ξij < 1,
νij +
2
(
Li2(
ξij−1
ξij
)−Li2(
ξij−1
2ξij
)
)
−Li2(−ξij)+ζ2
(1−ξij)2
, ξij > 1.
̟, νij , ξij , ζ1 and ζ2 are defined in Appendix C.
Proof: Please see Appendix C.
In order to highlight the secrecy improvement, let us com-
pare the ESR of our scheme to that of the TDMA-like scheme
[6], where the user with the best channel condition transmits
the secure information signal with power P to the BS in each
time slot. Similarly, the ESR of the TDMA-like one in the
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Fig. 1. ESR vs. the index of the served user.
high SNR regime is approximated as
RHis,TD ≈
{ K∑
i=1
(−1)i+1CiK log i
}+
. (10)
As can be seen from (10), increasing transmit power does
not improve the ESR of the TDMA-like scheme. In contrast,
the ESR of our scheme scales with log ρ2 in the high SNR
regime. Since the served user is not the one with the best
channel condition, our scheme achieves a less multiuser gain
than the TDMA-like scheme. However, the use of jamming
helps the BS to benefit from high transmit power, thus it
significantly improve the secrecy performance.
IV. SIMLULATIONS
We plot the analytic result in Corollary 1 and the numerical
result in Fig. 1. The numerical results are obtained by perform-
ing Monte Carlo experiments consisting of 10000 independent
trials. We set ρ = 20 dB. This figure illustrates the achievable
ESR vs. the index of the served user. Note that, when the
served user is the K-th user, no user is employed to transmit
jamming signal, it is the TDMA-like scheme proposed in [6].
For comparison, the secrecy rate of Yang’s scheme proposed
in [3] is also plotted, where all the users except the served
user operate as helpers and the power budget of each node in
the transmission is assumed to be P . Hence, Yang’s scheme
consumes more power than our proposed scheme.
Fig. 1 shows that the analytic results agree well with the
numerical results even when ρ = 20 dB. As can be seen,
the optimal user to be served is the 3-th user when N = 4,
while it is the 7-th user when N = 8. It is shown that when
the best user is selected to communicate with, the ESR of
our scheme achieves a much higher secrecy rate than that of
the TDMA-like scheme and Yang’s scheme. This is because
the TDMA-like scheme gains no benefit from jamming while
Yang’s scheme requires two phases to coordinate the jamming
signals in each date transmission round.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This letter proposed a novel dual user selection scheme to
enhance the security of uplink transmission. Analytical results
of ESR for the proposed scheme have been developed. It
has been recognized that the proposed scheme can benefit
from multiuser diversity gain and friendly jamming, which
significantly enhances the security.
APPENDIX A
Let X = |hn|2 and Y = |hK |2. The joint probability density
functions of the two order statistics, X and Y , is given as [9]
fX,Y (x, y)
= Cn−1K (1 − e
−x)n−1(e−x − e−y)K−n−1e−xe−y, x < y.
Define T = |hK|
2
|hn|2+
2
ρ
. The CDF of T can be calculated as
FT (t) = P
{
y
x+ 2/ρ
≤ t
}
=


Cn−1K
∫∞
0
(1− e−x)n−1e−xdx∫ xt+ 2t
ρ
x
(e−x − e−y)K−n−1e−ydy, t ≥ 1,
Cn−1K
∫ 2t
ρ(1−t)
0 (1− e
−x)n−1e−xdx∫ xt+ 2t
ρ
x
(e−x − e−y)K−n−1e−ydy, 0 ≤ t < 1.
When t ≥ 1, we further have
FT (t) =
Cn−1K
K − n
∫ ∞
0
(1− e−x)n−1e−x(e−x − e−(xt+
2t
ρ
))K−ndx
=
K−n∑
i=0
Ξi0
∫ ∞
0
(1− e−x)n−1e−
2ti
ρ
−(i(t−1)+K−n+1)xdx
=
K−n∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=0
Ξije
− 2ti
ρ
∫ ∞
0
e−(i(t−1)+K−n+1+j)xdx
=
K−n∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=0
Ξije
− 2ti
ρ
i(t− 1) +K − n+ 1 + j
. (11)
where Ξij is defined in (8). Similarly, we can proof the case
0 < t < 1.
APPENDIX B
Let X = |hn|2. The CDF of the n-th order statistics, |hn|2,
is given by [9]
FX(x) =
K∑
i=n
CiK(1− e
−x)i(e−x)K−i. (12)
Then, the expectation of Cb,s can be calculated as
E [Cb,s] =
∫ ∞
0
ρ
2 (1− FX(x))
1 + ρ2x
dx =
K∑
i=1
(−1)i+1 CiK e
2i
ρ E1
(
2i
ρ
)
−
K−1∑
i=n
i∑
j=0
(−1)j CiK C
j
i e
2(K+j−i)
ρ E1
(
2(K + j − i)
ρ
)
.
(13)
Next, we calculate the expectation of Ce,s. As we have
discussed in Section III-A, the K-th user operates as a
jamming user and transmit the jamming signal with a rate
log(1+ΓK,nb,z ). The achievable rate at the eavesdropper can be
further given as
Ce,s =


log
(
1 + ρ2 |gn|
2
)
, ΓK,nb,z ≤ Γ
K,n
e,z ,
log
(
1 + |gn|
2
|gK |2+
2
ρ
)
, ΓK,nb,z > Γ
K,n
e,z .
(14)
4Let T = ΓK,nb,z =
|hK |
2
|hn|2+
2
ρ
, Y = |gK |2 and Z = |gn|2. The
expectation of Ce,s is given as
E [Ce,s] =
∫ y
z+2
ρ
0
dFT (t)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
log
(
1 +
ρ
2
z
)
e−z−ydzdy
+
∫ 0
y
z+2
ρ
dFT (t)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
log
z + y + 2
ρ
y + 2
ρ
e−z−ydzdy
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
log
z + y + 2
ρ
y + 2
ρ
e−z−ydzdy
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
FT
( y
z + 2
ρ
)
log
(1 + ρ2z)(y +
2
ρ
)
z + y + 2
ρ
e−z−ydzdy.
(15)
Let Re1 and Re2 denote the first term and the second term of
the right-hand-side (RHS) in (15), respectively. The expression
of Re1 can be easily given as
Re1 = 1−
2
ρ
e
2
ρ E1
(
2
ρ
)
. (16)
We further define u = y
z+ 2
ρ
and v = y. The Jacobian matrix
is J =
∣∣∣∣ dzdu dzdvdy
du
dy
dv
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ − vu2 1u0 1
∣∣∣∣, and its determinant is
|J | = − v
u2
. Therefore, Re2 can be calculated as
Re2 = e
2
ρ
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
log
1 + ρ2v
1 + u
vFT (u)
u2
e−
u+1
u
vdudv
= e
2
ρ
∫ ∞
0
(e 2(u+1)ρu E1 ( 2(u+1)ρu )+ 1− log(u+ 1)
(u+ 1)2
−
2
ρ
e
2(u+1)
ρu E1
( 2(u+1)
ρu
)
u(u+ 1)
)
FT (u)du. (17)
Substituting the results in (13), (16), and (17) into (7) yields
the result in Theorem 1. The proof is completed.
APPENDIX C
Using the result e 1x E1
(
1
x
)
≈ log x− γ as x→∞ [4], the
expectation of Cb,s at high SNR can be approximated as
E [Cb,s] ≈ log
ρ
2
− γ +̟. (18)
where ̟ , −
∑K−1
i=n
∑i
j=0(−1)
j+1 CiK C
j
i log(K + j − i) +∑K
i=1(−1)
iCiK log i. As ρ → ∞, it always holds T =
|hK |
2
|hn|2+
2
ρ
→ |hK |
2
|hn|2
≥ 1, and thus it holds FT (t) = 0 when
0 ≤ t < 1. Therefore, the approximation of FT (t) at high
SNR, denoted by FHiT (t), can be given as
FHiT (t) =
{∑K−n
i=0
∑n−1
j=0
Ξij
i(t−1)+K−n+1+j , t ≥ 1,
0, 0 ≤ t < 1.
Then, the expectation of Ce,s in the high SNR regime can
be approximated as
E [Ce,s] ≈1 +
∫ ∞
0
log ρ2 + 1− γ + log
u
(u+1)2
(u + 1)2
FHiT (u)du
=
log ρ2 + 1− γ
2
+
K−n∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=0
Ξij
i
Υij , (19)
where
Υij ,
∫ ∞
1
log ρ2 + 1− γ + log
u
(u+1)2
(u + 1)2(u+ ξij)
du, (20)
ξij ,
K − n+ 1 + j
i
− 1. (21)
To obtain a closed-form expression for Υij , we should
consider two cases, ξij = 1 and ξij 6= 1. When ξij = 1,
we have
Υij =
∫ ∞
1
log ρ2 + 1− γ + log
u
(u+1)2
(u+ 1)3
du
=
log ρ2 + 1− γ
8
+
log 2
4
−
3
8
. (22)
When ξij 6= 1, we have
Υij =
∫ ∞
1
log ρ2 + 1− γ + log
u
(u+1)2
(u+ 1)2(u + ξij)
du
=
∫ ∞
1
log ρ2 + 1− γ
(u+ 1)2(u+ ξij)
du+
∫ ∞
1
log (u+1)
2
u
(1− ξij)(u+ 1)2
du
+
1
1− ξij
∫ ∞
1
log u(u+1)2
(u+ 1)(u+ ξij)
du
=
(
log
ρ
2
+ 1− γ
)ξij − 1 + 2 log 21+ξij
2(1− ξij)2
+
1
1− ξij
+
1
ξij(1− ξij)
∫ 1
0
log v(v+1)2
(v + 1)(v + 1/ξij)
dv
= νij + µij , (23)
where νij ,
(
log ρ2 + 1 − γ
) ξij−1+2 log 21+ξij
2(1−ξij)2
+ 11−ξij −
pi2+12 log2 2
12(1−ξij)2
and
µij =


2
(
Li2(
ξij−1
ξij
)−Li2(
ξij−1
2ξij
)
)
−Li2(−ξij)+ζ1
(1−ξij)2
, ξij < 1,
2
(
Li2(
ξij−1
ξij
)−Li2(
ξij−1
2ξij
)
)
−Li2(−ξij)+ζ2
(1−ξij)2
, ξij > 1,
where ζ1 , 2 log 2 log ξij+1ξij − log
2 2 and ζ2 ,
2 log 2 log
ξij+1
ξij−1
+ log2
ξij−1
ξij
− log2
ξij−1
2ξij
. Combining (18)
and (19), the result in Corollary 1 is obtained.
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